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Abstract Schumpeter’s theory of democracy can be read through the lens of the
cognitive approach to rationality. Schumpeter himself constructed his theory on the
basis of his (neglected) conception of conscious rationality, which considers the
process of thinking as composed of conscious/deliberate and unconscious/automatic
components. The prevalence of the deliberate over the automatic component can occur
in different degrees; as a consequence, individuals exhibit different levels of conscious
rationality. Schumpeter makes clear that an essential attribute of democracy is its being
a system of government capable of working notwithstanding a low degree of conscious
rationality among its citizens. Given this condition, the process of political communi-
cation and persuasion can lead to two very different outcomes: a fair social construction
of the democratic institutions, in which the struggle for the vote is achieved through a
critical debate among leaders and citizens; and an unfair construction, based on the
prevalence of emotive forces of persuasion over rationality and on cheating of the
leaders at the expense of their citizens. Schumpeter suggests that the main element that
fosters a fair construction is the effectiveness of competition, which can advance the
rational elements in the political debate and the self-determination of the citizens’ will:
a slow process that – he warns - may be effective only in the long run, and does not
preserve democracy from the risk of decline.
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1 Introduction
Part IV of Schumpeter’s Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy is characterized by a
brilliant and realistic picture of capitalism supported by new and powerful theoretical
ideas, which in my opinion have not thus far fully realized their potential. If we
consider the pages dedicated to entrepreneurship and to democracy, we see that the
intellectual toolbox he used in his previous works - based on the economic thought of
the French and Austrian schools, and to some extent limited by the implicit contrasts
between those two schools - has undergone a radical evolution.
Schumpeter’s new ideas on the nature of democracy also entail new ideas on the
nature of human behavior within institutions, and these ideas conflict to a certain extent
with the corpus of traditional economic doctrines. It follows that there are only two
alternatives: either to attempt to explore whether its depiction of market and democracy
can be interpreted within a unified frame, or to consider the analysis of market and of
democracy as separate conceptual domains. The latter is the traditional approach, while
the former – I suggest - implies a reading of Schumpeter’s thought in the light of the
recent advancements in the cognitive approach to human behavior: a mental experi-
ment that I propose in the following pages.
The chances of successfully applying this approach are facilitated by the fact that
Schumpeter himself reflected on the meaning of rationality in many parts of his works.
He started from the classical definitions provided by Max Weber and then moved
significant steps ahead, urged by the necessity to encompass under the same notion of
rationality the different kinds of contrasting behavior manifested by the subjects that
populate his theory : entrepreneurs, consumers, citizens and political leaders are in fact
depicted as carriers of different kinds and levels of rationality. In what follows, I will
show that Schumpeter’s theory is, to some extent, a forerunner of the basic principles of
bounded rationality. In this introduction, I will summarize Schumpeter’s main assump-
tions on rationality and their consequence to the architecture of his theory of democ-
racy, by extracting Schumpeter’s’ ideas and interpreting them through the concepts of
cognitive psychology.
1. Schumpeter’s analysis presupposes limits on the rationality and knowledge of
individuals both in economics and politics. These limits are clarified and explored
under the label of “conscious rationality”: in his view individuals may have
different degrees of conscious rationality, and so, to practice rationality in a given
domain, it is necessary to hold specific competence and knowledge. When com-
petence is very high, as is the case of entrepreneurial activity, rationality can be
described as a process of creative response, i.e., of discovery under uncertain
conditions, analogous to Simon’s procedural rationality. When competence is
missing or is very modest, the emotional and routine elements of reasoning
supplant logical thought and individuals are exposed to irrational external mes-
sages, forms of persuasion and advertising, both in the economic and political
arena. (Schumpeter (2003), 363)
2. Given that an economic or a political decision requires expertise, individuals may
decide with full competence and rationality only in a limited number of domains.
The element that reinforces competence is the familiarity with and proximity to a
given decision context, and, for this reason, at least a part of economic decisions
140 M. Egidi
can be made in a more competent way than political ones. To paraphrase
Schumpeter, when we move away from the private concerns of the family and
the business office into those regions of national and international affairs that lack a
direct link with the private concerns, individual volition ceases to fulfill the
requirements of conscious rationality : the degree of conscious rationality dumbs
down to a very modest level. (Schumpeter (2003), 259–261)
3. Democracy is based primarily on delegation because of the limits of competence
and knowledge of its citizens. Leaders are supposed to possess the specific
competence in politics that is modest or missing among those they represent. They
collect the will and reflect the opinions of their constituency, but to a limited extent;
in fact, as with the entrepreneur, the political leader may be an innovator, able to
bring forth new ideas and proposals that may conflict with the common feeling or
the average opinion of his constituency. Such an ability requires vision and the
ability to persuade. This means that leaders “may fashion and, within very wide
limits, even create the will of the people. “(Schumpeter (2003), 263)
4. Of course, a leader may use his persuasive power in two ways: in a positive sense,
if he tries to convince his constituency by virtue of an attempt clearly and
transparently to expound his proposals; or in a negative sense, if he conveys
information, ideas or ideologies to the citizens in a systematically distorted way.
In the latter case, the leader does not appeal to rationality but rather uses commu-
nicative and persuasive techniques typical of advertising, based on psychological
associations and related emotions. (Schumpeter (2003), 263)
5. The previous points imply that, in a democracy, leaders can manipulate opinions
and produce systematic distortions of the popular will: this is a crucial aspect of
Schumpeter’s analysis. It follows that if we do not want to relegate it to a pure
description due to his acute insight, it is necessary to appeal to the modern theory
of psychology of cognition, in which the characteristics of reasoning and, in
particular, the role of persuasion and manipulation, has been extensively studied
and experimentally proved. To this end, the next section is dedicated to the
connections between Schumpeter’s notion of conscious rationality and the modern
theory of bounded rationality.
6. Schumpeter depicts democracy as an institution that allows people to achieve
political decisions without necessarily having a high degree of awareness and
competence. The main problem that Schumpeter has to solve in sketching the
fundamentals of democracy is conceiving institutions that produce rational, or at
least reasonable, public decisions despite substantial limits in terms of individuals’
rationality and competence. He highlights the observation that a defining property
of democracy is its being an institution that may function even if the degree of
awareness, competence and analytical effort of citizens is low, provided that it is
balanced by responsible behavior on the part of its leaders.
7. Naturally, this view attributes fragility to democratic institutions, insofar as they are
exposed to serious risks: risks that emerge if the design of the internal workings of
democratic institutions does not allow the process of collective decision-making to
work properly with a transparent allocation of responsibilities. In this case, ambi-
tious leaders may implement various forms of shirking that can lead to a dangerous
undermining of the quality of democracy. This is the reason why competition is an
essential element of democracy: it is the only method that permits the emergence of
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a definite will among citizens, by raising the level of conscious rationality through
a pacific political struggle. The only method that reduces the citizens’ chances of
being fooled by irresponsible leaders and assures a good quality of democracy is a
process of reducing the citizens’ competence gap, which, according to Schumpeter,
can only occur in the long run.
2 Conscious rationality and bounded rationality
Schumpeter’s ideas on rationality were advanced on occasion in many of his major
publications, but it is in “Rationality in Social Sciences”, a document written when
Schumpeter was beginning to work on his Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, that
his views are most carefully expounded. 1 Here he advances the idea of conscious
rationality by considering the process of thinking as composed of conscious/deliberate
and unconscious/automatic components. The prevalence of the deliberate component
over the automatic one can happen to different degrees, and, in consequence, individ-
uals may exhibit different degrees of rationality. This element implies that the analyst,
while applying a rational schema to the actor’s behavior, must take into account that
“models of rational action do not necessarily imply conscious rationality on the part of
the actors” (Schumpeter 1947, 584).
Thus, if we take this concept seriously, we soon understand that Schumpeter uses it
to explain why the same individual can be fully rational in his economic activity and
scarcely rational when making political decisions. The key aspect is that an individual
may have different degrees of conscious rationality depending upon the domain of
competence in which he operates: a low level of conscious rationality characterizes a
citizen’s voting decision if he does not (and sometimes does not want to) acquire
sufficient expertise to make highly competent decisions in the field of politics. The
same person may exhibit a high degree of conscious rationality in a different domain,
for example, economics.
A similar distinction can be found in the domain of economics, where a consumer’s
behavior may be characterized by a modest degree of conscious rationality, while an
entrepreneur’s behavior may unfold at the highest degree of rationality.
In Rationality in Social Sciences 2 Schumpeter explicitly declares that the assumption
of conscious rationality is an essential pillar for the microfoundations of his theory of
democracy: his new, “reformed” theory of democracy considerably drops the hypothesis
that all individuals make their choices with conscious rationality at the highest level.
As I have said, Schumpeter must resort to a view of rationality that is broader and
richer in respect to the one codified by Lionel Robbins’s in his Nature and Significance
of Economic Science (1932), to encompass the different types of behavior exhibited by
the actors who populate his depiction of democracy and capitalism.
1 The paper was discovered by Professor Loring Allen of the University of Missouri in St. Louis among
Schumpeter’s papers in the Harvard University archives. For a wide analysis of the various aspects of
rationality that Schumpeter discusses in the paper, see Festré and Garrouste (2008). In what follows I will
focus on one specific aspect of his views on the topic, the meaning of “conscious rationality”, which has been
largely neglected by commentators thus far.
2 Schumpeter (1947) 585
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I will start by examining the notion of conscious rationality within the domain of the
Theory of Economic Development, and subsequently (next paragraph) I will discuss the
domain of the theory of democracy.
The dualism between a stationary regime (circular flow) and an evolutionary regime
(development), on which the Theory of Economic Development was constructed,
naturally required a description of two different ways of making economic decisions:
the routinized behavior that characterizes the circular flow and the innovative behavior
that describes entrepreneurial action.
Richard Langlois (1996) clearly underlines the argument:
“The circular flow is a closed world. There may be changes in data and various
shocks to which the agents must adapt, but there is nothing fundamentally new. It is the
entrepreneur whose task it is to introduce novelty. And novelty, for Schumpeter, brings
with it problems not found in the circular flow. The entrepreneur who steps outside the
confines of the ordinary
“…must really to some extent do what tradition does for him in everyday life, viz.
consciously plan his conduct in every particular. There will bemuchmore conscious
rationality in this than in customary action, which as such does not need to be
reflected on at all; but this plan must necessarily be open not only to errors greater in
degree, but also to other kinds of errors than those occurring in customary action.
.... How different a thing this is becomes clearer if one bears in mind the impossi-
bility of surveying exhaustively all the effects and counter-effects of the projected
enterprise. Even as many of them as could in theory be ascertained if one had
unlimited time and means must practically remain in the dark.… Here the success
of everything depends upon intuition, the capacity of seeing things in a way which
afterwards proves to be true, even though it cannot be established at the moment,
and of grasping the essential fact, discarding the unessential, even though one can
give no account of the principles by which this is done” (Schumpeter (1934) 85).
Langlois comments
By stepping outside the bounds of routine, the entrepreneur extends the sphere in
which conscious planning is necessary for successful action. But, because of
“bounded rationality,” he or she cannot in fact act rationally in the strict sense
and, as a result, must rely on intuition. Thus entrepreneurship à la Schumpeter is
an extra-rational activity from the point of view of the logical conception of
rationality— though it is very much a rational activity according to Schumpeter’s
own meaning of the term. (Langlois, (1996) 5)
This comment helps us to consider entrepreneurial activity as a “creative response”
fundamentally linked to a process of discovery under uncertain conditions, a process
analyzed in great depth by Herbert Simon in his studies on procedural rationality. 3A
3 See, in particular, Simon (1985) who explicitly attributes “procedural rationality” to political decision
making, characterized by inconsistencies or incompleteness. A similar view can be found in Arena R.
Danger-Hagnauer C. (Eds) (2002), 59
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good sample of this activity can be viewed when we examine the behavior of a chess
master: nobody would consider the chess master to be irrational when he is playing
against his opponent, simply because his behavior cannot be reduced to the standard
model of optimization. The point is that, in this context, rationality (in a broad,
Weberian sense) is no longer a process of optimization: The chess playing activity
cannot be reduced to optimization because the winning strategy, which already exists, is
not practically computable. 4 Rationality can thus be interpreted as optimization only
under the condition whereby the available alternatives (deterministic or stochastic) are
known in advance. In conditions of procedural uncertainty, not all alternatives can be
discovered and the rational strategy for a player is to discover more strategies than his
opponent.
This kind of process has been extensively studied by Herbert Simon and many other
scholars over the past 40 years, considering chess as an ideal context 5 for the empirical
study of expert decision making. The players’mental mechanism, which can be defined
as “procedurally rational”, is described by Simon in the following way:
“Research in cognitive psychology in recent years has made great progress in
understanding human expertise […] First, expertise is based on extensive knowl-
edge […] Aworld-class expert in any field (several domains have been studied in
some detail) holds in memory some 50,000 chunks (familiar units) of relevant
information. This body of knowledge is stored in the form of an indexed
encyclopedia […]. Associated with each chunk is a set of cues which, whenever
evoked by a stimulus, will provide access to that chunk in semantic memory. […]
Armed with knowledge stored in his [memory], the expert is prepared (but only
in the domain of expertise) to respond to many situations “intuitively”—that is,
by recognizing the situation and evoking an appropriate response—and also to
draw on the stored [knowledge] for more protracted and systematic analysis of
difficult problems.” (Simon (1991) 129)
The mental mechanism is the same for all players, but works at different levels,
depending upon the degree of expertise of the player (from novice to great master). The
“ability to see things in a way which afterwards proves to be true”, the intuition of a
great master is, in reality, a complex searching activity guided by heuristics in which
the master “sees” the evolution of the match a number of steps further than his
opponent.
We could interpret Schumpeter’s description of the capacity for innovative activity
or “seeing things in a way which afterwards proves to be true, even though it cannot be
established at the moment”, with an immediate application of the theory of bounded
rationality. With this goal, imagine a club of people who decide, during their vacation,
to hold a chess tournament. Suppose all of them in the past have been trained at an
intermediate level, and have approximately the same (modest) degree of competence.
4 This means that not all potentially available strategies can be discovered with the current computing power.
5 “As genetics needs its model organisms, its Drosophila and Neurospora, so psychology needs standard task
environments around which knowledge and understanding can cumulate. Chess has proved to be an excellent
model environment for this purpose”. (Simon and Chase 1973, 394)
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This means that they know the most common basic strategies, and therefore each of
them understands the strategy of his opponent after the opening moves and can
reasonably try to predict the next move. Now, a grand master lands in the club:
every player in the club will be unable to predict the grand master’s moves because
he draws upon a vastly wider repertoire of strategies and can explore in much
greater depth than his opponent the possible sequences of moves-countermoves at
his disposal. To the eyes of the club players, the master’s strategy is unpredictable,
and exhibits precisely the characteristics that Schumpeter attributes to an innovator:
“From the standpoint of the observer who is in full possession of all relevant
facts, it can always be understood ex post; but it can practically never be
understood ex ante; that is to say, it cannot be predicted by applying the ordinary
rules of inference from the pre-existing facts.” (Schumpeter (1947), 150)
So far, then, we could explain innovation purely on the basis of the gap of
competence 6 between the innovator and the other individuals.
By virtue of a vast empirical research, Simon created computer programs to simulate
the search process, and the attempt proved extremely successful: an heir of Simon’s
programs, Deep Blue, won against a world champion on February 10, 1996, when it
defeated Garry Kasparov. We could thus say that a program may display an artificial
competence superior to the human one, and, once again, the competence gap is the right
criterion that fits with Schumpeter’s requisites for creativity.
Despite the success, programs like Deep Blue exhibit significant limits: they can
brilliantly reproduce the heuristic search, and also simulate adaptive changes of
strategy in a defined context; but to this day a program that simulates and reproduces
the creative activity for every problem solving context, and especially for scientific
discovery, has not been created. This does not destroy our criterion but instead renders
it more general: a creative change requires a competence that is still not available on the
basis of existing knowledge. This definition is coherent with the two key features of
creative action advanced by Schumpeter, i.e., unpredictability and the impossibility to
be understood ex ante. 7 Moreover, it implies that creativity may indeed have a
component that is due to chance, but is nonetheless robustly rooted in human compe-
tence and intelligence.
In sum, what we have is a modern and experimentally validated theory of
procedural rationality that explains the features of what Schumpeter intuitively
calls “conscious rationality at a high degree”. In conditions of procedural uncer-
tainty, 8 when an individual is highly competent in a particular domain, a creative
decision is the outcome of a complex process of research. I maintain that this
activity is highly rational.
6 See Heiner (1983), 562
7 These requirements could be translated in terms of the difficulty of computing a problem. An interesting
attempt to give a formal representation of the problem of non-computability in economics is due to Velupillai
(2000).
8 Dosi and Egidi (1991); see also Dequech (2001)
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3 Conscious rationality and dual model of reasoning
The theory of bounded rationality can also be applied in order to understand behavior in
conditions of low competence, given that, according to Schumpeter, it happens for the
consumer’s choice and the citizen’s political choice. To understand better this case, we
have to explore further developments of the theory.
As we have seen, Simon’s theory maintains that, in the course of acquiring their
skill, chessplayers store chunks in long-term memory corresponding to patterns of
pieces. The recall from long term memory, during the match, is fast and automatic, and
constitutes the basis for the conscious process of symbolic manipulation of the mental
items that have been recalled. Beyond Simon’s findings, this dualism between uncon-
scious and deliberate aspects of the process of thinking has been further explored over
the past years, also outside of the context of chess, as an early experiment by Schneider
and Shiffrin (1977) shows.
Thinking is again considered to emerge as an interaction between two kinds of
processes, one of which is automatic, and allows the retrieval of items from long term
memory: it proceeds without the subject’s control and without necessarily demanding
attention. It is called “automatic” or “intuitive”. The second process is called “con-
trolled” or “deliberate” and is the conscious activation of thoughts that require attention,
is capacity-limited, serial, and controlled by the subject. This approach is called the
“dual model account of reasoning” 9
In his theory of “conscious rationality”, Schumpeter is aware of the distinction
between automatic/unconscious and explicit/conscious components of the thought,
and preempts the basic distinction of the dual model in a remarkable way:
“I suspect that part of the opposition my theory of subjective rationality met in
our group, especially from Professor Parsons, is due to my infelicitous terminol-
ogy. Perhaps [….] I should not have used the word “conscious” since automati-
zation of often repeated actions will make forms of behavior subconscious which
are, nevertheless, included in my conscious rationality: if a mathematician solves
a differential equation in the best known manner he is being “consciously
rational” in my sense even if, in a particularly simple case, he writes down the
solution quite mechanically.” (Schumpeter 1947, 586).
This distinction is evident in many parts of Capitalism Socialism and Democracy,
albeit in a less precise way, in particular in Part III, Human Nature in Politics.10
Beyond the dualism to which I have referred, a third element that plays a key role in
reasoning is the impact of emotions. This element is stressed by Schumpeter in many
parts of his works, especially when he emphasizes the impact of political advertising on
citizens.
In the modern approach, it is widely accepted that emotions are a permanent element
that influence behavior. I will not seek to summarize the vast literature on this issue, but
9 See the early experiments by Schneider, W. and Shiffrin, R. (1977)
10 “During the second half of the last century, the idea of the human personality that is a homogeneous unit
and the idea of a definite will that is the prime mover of action have been steadily fading—even before the
times of Théodule Ribot and of Sigmund Freud”. (Schumpeter (2003), 256)
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simply recall the “somatic marker hypothesis” through which Damasio (1994) and
Bechara and Damasio (2005) explain how affective reactions ordinarily guide and
simplify decision making. 11
One reason to summarize briefly some of the characteristics of the dual approach to
thinking is that it allows us to provide a modern background for Schumpeter’s outsight
that social rules and norms may seriously curtail the ability of a citizen to make
inferences and to decide autonomously.
To this end, the advancements due to Kahneman and Tversky are most helpful: they
explore the interferences between the items memorized in long term memory, which
come to mind automatically, with the process of conscious deliberation. On the one
hand, the deliberate process may modify, correct or reject intuitive thoughts. On the
other, the working of the deliberate process may be undermined by the automatic one,
which can override with intuitive answers the process of deliberation.
This last process is particularly interesting in explaining Schumpeter’s observation
of the behavior of citizens facing a political choice. In the domains in which the
competence of an individual is very limited, the semantic content of the thought may
override the individual’s logical ability: prior knowledge and in particular social rules
and norms, may dumb down the ability to make inferences. This phenomenon is
demonstrated by two key experiments in cognitive psychology: the belief-bias effect,
and the Wason selection task 12 . The first one seeks to create a conflict between
responses based upon a process of logical reasoning and those derived from prior
belief about the truth of conclusions. The experiments show a very strong impact of
prior knowledge on the reasoning process. 13
The second experiment, the “Wason selection task”, clearly demonstrates the impact
of norms on logical reasoning: in particular, it shows that if the task is described as a
problem of social regulation, it can either be solved in a very easy way or cannot be
easily solved, in relation to the nature of the norm that is implied. (See Appendix). As a
consequence, social norms may have a major role either in fading or in making easier
the reasoning process. This fragility of the human capacity for reasoning can be
corrected only in the long run because, according to the dual model, the recall of items
that could hinder or foster the responses to given problems cannot be consciously
controlled: the memorized items have different degrees of accessibility. In consequence,
the only way to modify accessibility is through a slow process of learning through
which the influence of a hidden norm can be marginalized.
According to Kahneman “the acquisition of skills selectively increases the accessi-
bility of useful responses”.14 Chess provides a clear example: the more expert the chess
player becomes, the more sophisticated – and different – becomes the heuristic that
emerges when faced with the same distribution of pieces on a given chess board.
11 “The theory argues that affective somatic states associated with prior decision outcomes are used to guide
future decisions. For example, when a choice followed by a bad outcome occurs, an affective reaction
becomes associated with that choice. Once the affective reaction is sufficiently well-established, the reaction
occurs before a choice is made. Anticipation of a bad outcome before the bad choice is made prevents the bad
choice and leads, instead, to a better choice.” Hinson, Jameson, and Whitney (2002), 341. See also Damasio,
Tranel, & Damasio (1991)
12 Wason (1966)
13 Evans et al. (1983)
14 Kahneman (2002), 453
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Therefore individuals, improving their skill on a particular domain through prolonged
practice, may modify and increase accessibility to the memorized items. As we will see
later, Schumpeter points to exactly the same problem, i.e., the fact that citizens,
however well informed, can achieve more rational and competent political choice only
with time and effort, while, in the short run, the heuristic answer to a problem is rapid
and out of the full deliberate control and therefore subject to errors and biases.
We thus have a set of controlled experimental data and a basic analytical toolbox for
understanding and justifying Schumpeter’s outsights about the behavior in the domain
in which an individual does not possesses a high level of knowledge and competence.
According to Schumpeter, it is essential to consider the case in which the individuals
are consciously rational to a modest degree, which happens for every individual in
some area of competence, and is particularly common in the area of political choice.
“The old theory of democracy as formulated in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries presupposes degrees of awareness of one’s interests, clearness of ends,
rationality in the perception and use of means and, most important of all,
accessibility to rational argument which are altogether unrealistic. A reformed
theory of democracy could still use, to a considerable extent, rational schemata,
but it would have to drop, not wholly but also to a considerable extent, the
hypothesis of conscious rationality;(Schumpeter (1984), 585) 15
In Capitalism Socialism and Democracy the limits of human rationality are more
precisely highlighted. Here Schumpeter considers these limits as a universal trait of
human thinking, which characterizes both consumer choice on the market and citizen’s
voting decision in the political arena.
“Economists, learning to observe their facts more closely, have begun to discover
that, even in the most ordinary currents of daily life, their consumers do not quite
live up to the idea that the economic textbook used to convey. On the one hand
their wants are nothing like as definite and their actions upon those wants nothing
like as rational and prompt. On the other hand they are so amenable to the
influence of advertising and other methods of persuasion that producers often
seem to dictate to them instead of being directed by them.” Schumpeter (2003),
257
The ability of individuals to reflect, to form independent opinions and to decide is
even more limited in the domain of political decisions:
“even if there were no political groups trying to influence him, the typical citizen
would in political matters tend to yield to extrarational or irrational prejudice and
15 Citizens – or a majority of them - are supposed to exert a low level of conscious rationality when debating
politics. This means that they have a high competence gap in this domain, which limits their analytical skills:
they cannot use their problem-solving attitudes because of their ignorance in politics, not because they are
irrational. For this reason, while I share many aspects of the interpretation that Manfred Prisching (1995) gives
to Schumpeter’s Theory of Democracy, I would not define Schumpeter as the founder of the “irrational
choice” theory. Simon (1985) illustrates very convincingly this point especially in the paragraph “Bounded
Rationality is not Irrationality”, 297 and 301. See also Dequech (2001) 216.
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impulse. The weakness of the rational processes he applies to politics and the
absence of effective logical control over the results he arrives at would in
themselves suffice to account for that.” Schumpeter (2003), 262
In conclusion, Schumpeter’s broad view of rationality contains in nuce and in a
simplified way certain principles on rationality that are strikingly similar to the ones
that preside over Simon’s theory of bounded rationality.
With his conceptual distinction between high and low degree of conscious rational-
ity, he can encompass two different kind of behavior: the leader/innovator and the
citizen/consumer. The first form of behavior arises from situations of unpredictability,
uncertainty and complexity, and accordingly is treated by Schumpeter as a problem of
search and innovation. His description of innovative activity fits with the notion of
“procedural rationality” that describes the search and decision process of an expert in
conditions of uncertainty.
As regards the second form of behavior, Schumpeter holds that consumer choice and
the political choice by the citizen, given that they are conducted in domains where their
competence is low, are characterized by a distinctly low level of “conscious rational-
ity”: in these situations, the limits of rationality are described - in a vivid and rich
manner - as dominated by extrarational impulses, in a way that again fits with the dual
model account of reasoning, and in particular with the experimental data on the biasing
role of social norms on human reasoning.
Thus we have collected the basic elements of modern cognitive psychology that
support Schumpeter’s ideas on rationality and innovation, and can further use it to
understand the limits of both the market and democracy.
4 From deliberative to representative democracy: human nature in politics
With the limits of rationality in mind, let us turn to what Schumpeter calls his “reformed
theory of democracy”
“The eighteenth-century philosophy of democracy may be couched in the fol-
lowing definition: the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for
arriving at political decisions which realizes the common good by making the
people itself decide issues through the election of individuals who are to assemble
in order to carry out its will.” Schumpeter (2003), 250
This “classical” conception of democracy is based on three important pillars: the
idea that there exists a common good that people can achieve, that this good may be
expressed through a shared will (Volonté Général), and that the Common Will is
achieved via a process of deliberation amongst the population. One of the more
important, indeed perhaps the most striking point of departure of Schumpeter from
the classical theory of democracy, is his critical analysis of these three concepts.
“There is… no such thing as a uniquely determined common good that all people
could agree on or be made to agree on by the force of rational argument. This is
due not primarily to the fact that some people may want things other than the
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common good but to the much more fundamental fact that to different individuals
and groups the common good is bound to mean different things.” Schumpeter
(2003), 251
Here, the implicit idea is that the existence of a variety of interests, beliefs, values,
opinions within a society is a measure of the degree of freedom of its citizens; the main
problem is, therefore, which institutional form can guarantee a balance of citizens’
conflicting opinions, values and interests. The process by which political movements
lead a (limited) part of the population towards converging opinions and will is in any
case highly uncertain, complex and difficult. The question is how an agreement among
many individuals can be constructed, how long it can remain stable, and what are the
communicative structures that may lead to the achievement of a common will, in
conditions of much dispersed knowledge and limits to rationality.
“… our chief troubles about the classical theory centered in the proposition that
“the people” hold a definite and rational opinion about every individual question
and that they give effect to this opinion—in a democracy—by choosing “repre-
sentatives” who will see to it that opinion is carried out. “Schumpeter (2003), 269
In reading Schumpeter through the lens of cognitive psychology, we should say that
autonomous reasoning requires a high level of cognitive effort, and that the effort is
related to the degree of relevance that individuals ascribe to the issues in discussion. It
requires attention and motivations; attention and motivations are, in turn, influenced by
proximity and familiarity to the problems. Schumpeter claims that simply because the
proximity and familiarity of citizens as regards political choice are very modest, they
maintain their cognitive efforts at a low level, and therefore their autonomy of thought
is very low, and persists even in the face of any effort to increase their awareness
through critical analysis and information.
“[….] thus the typical citizen drops down to a lower level of mental performance
as soon as he enters the political field. He argues and analyzes in a way which he
would readily recognize as infantile within the sphere of his real interests. He
becomes a primitive again. His thinking becomes associative and affective.”
(Italics added) 16 Schumpeter (2003), 262
This gap of competence, of course, is variable within the population: only a minority
of individuals make full and critical use of the available information, but, more
importantly, this level is not a “given” for all time. In fact, while overstressing the
limits of human mental performances in the face of political decisions, Schumpeter
depicts a process in which everyone, under the right conditions, can increase his degree
of awareness. When this happens, and an individual decides to increase his participa-
tion in politics, his thinking, which is permanently characterized by a complex dynamic
between autonomous and induced individual will, may achieve the highest levels of
autonomy and consciousness. The question is to understand what elements trigger or
16 This picture has been fully confirmed by experimentation in psychology, and important literature makes
clear the reasons for and conditions of this failure. See also the next section of the present article.
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prevent the emergence of a higher participation among citizens. It is a question that has
been explored in great depth in recent years both within cognitive sciences and within
the disciplines of communication and networking,17 as we will see next.
5 The dualism between autonomous and induced individual will
Schumpeter’s picture of the role of persuasion and advertising plays a significant role
because it describes limits and risks implicit to the relation between a leader and his
constituency. It is based on an important dualism between autonomous and induced
individual will. This dualism has been largely studied in contemporary psychology, and
the origin of induced will is related to the dualism between unconscious and deliberate
aspects of the process of thinking.
The experimental evidence of the interferences between the deliberate and the
intuitive components of reasoning allow us to identify the conditions under which
the unconscious and emotional elements can prevail over the deliberate component;
these conditions are vividly depicted in section III of chapter XXI of Capitalism
Socialism and Democracy, in which Schumpeter warns that, under particular condi-
tions, political behavior can be reduced to “associative and affective” conduct, beyond
rational control.
By clarifying the ways in which the deliberate, the unconscious and the emotional
components play a role within the process of reasoning, we can understand the ways
through which persuasion has a central impact on the process of reasoning and can
frame Schumpeter’s analyses of the effects of advertising on individual will.
In common language, the concept of “persuasion” has a broad semantic scope,
meaning the art of modifying the ideas or behavior of the other. Social psychology has
developed an extensive degree of literature on this topic, often in relation to the study of
advertising.
It is widely acknowledged that, under some conditions, persuasion may work as a
process through which one subject modifies another’s ideas, where both parts are
acutely conscious of the ongoing transformation, as occurs in teacher-student relations;
conversely, under other conditions, persuasion flows through processes that modify the
ideas of the other in a way that is, at least partially or totally, out of the conscious
control of the recipient, as occurs in advertising.
The former kind of process requires a high degree of mental elaboration by the
recipient, and so it may be reinforced through debate and critical discussion; the latter
flows through unilateral communication and pre-selected information, and is received
by the recipient without highly active elaboration.
The dualism between autonomous and induced will can be explained within the dual
model account of reasoning because the impact of the process of persuasion on an
individual may be remarkably different depending upon the degree of his mental active
reaction, which can be low and governed by heuristics or high and governed by
17 One of the most noteworthy accounts is given by the Ryan and Deci Self-Determination Theory. They
distinguish between different types of motivation based on the different reasons or goals that give rise to an
action. “The most basic distinction is between intrinsic motivation, which refers to doing something because it
is inherently interesting or enjoyable, and extrinsic motivation, which refers to doing something because it
leads to a separable outcome”. Ryan and Deci (2000) 54
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deliberation. Both systems are activated, and reciprocally interact, during the process,
and the interesting question is which one dominates the other.
The two approaches to communication that are more widely accepted today, the
Heuristic Model (Chaiken (1980)) and the Elaboration Likelihood Model (Petty and
Cacioppo (1981)),18 both make reference to the dual model, and distinguish between
systematic (or central route) processing and heuristic (or peripheral route) processing.
“Systematic processing implies that people have formed or updated their attitudes
by actively attending to and cognitively elaborating persuasive argumentation. In
contrast, heuristic processing implies that people have formed or changed their
attitudes by invoking heuristics”
“These dual-process theories regard systematic processing as more effortful and
capacity limited than heuristic processing. They therefore assume that heuristic
processing predominates when motivation or capacity for effortful processing is
low; for example, when the issue or one’s judgment is inconsequential [..] or
when time does not permit extensive information processing.” Chaiken and
Maheswaran (1994), 460
It is easy to recognize that the impact of advertising is particularly significant - as all
of us experience in our daily lives - as the recipient of the persuasive message offers a
cognitively low-level reaction, displaying a predominance of heuristic processes over
rational ones.
This idea emerges clearly from Schumpeter’s picture of political decision making:
‘The only point that matters here is that, Human Nature in Politics being what is,
[leaders] are able to fashion and, within very wide limits, even to create the will of
the people. What we are confronted with in the analysis is not a genuine but a
manufactured will. And often this artefact is all that in reality corresponds to the
volonté générale of the classical doctrine. So far as this is so, the will of the
people is the product and not the motive power of the political process.
The ways in which issues and the popular will on any issue are being
manufactured is exactly analogous to the ways of commercial advertising. We
find the same attempts to contact the subconscious. We find the same technique
of creating favorable and unfavorable associations which are the more effective
the less rational they are. We find the same evasions and reticences and the same
trick of producing opinion by reiterated assertion that is successful precisely to
the extent to which it avoids rational argument and the danger of awakening the
critical faculties of the people. Schumpeter (2003), 263, italics added
Schumpeter emphasizes the negative effects of persuasion when it takes place in a
hidden way without allowing rational control by citizens, but also offers remedies for
18 Petty and Cacioppo suggest that “there are’central’ and ‘peripheral’ routes to persuasion, with the’central
route’ representing the processes involved when elaboration likelihood is high and the’peripheral route’
typifying the processes operative when elaboration likelihood is low”.
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the most negative effects of hidden persuasion and advertising. He suggests that the
main remedy is the intelligent and critical use of the internal mechanisms of democracy.
This means that a reciprocal rivalry is vital to induce political leaders to offer credible
programs to voters, by using many different forms of persuasion.
To identify better these forms of persuasion, it is important to distinguish clearly the
different frames in which persuasion takes place, and the consequent impact it may
have on individuals and institutions:
Persuasion can happen:
– in a context of reciprocal trust and in an explicit setting, as in the teacher-scholar
relation, in which critical debate explicitly assumes an essential role19;
– in a context in which one part seeks explicitly to modify the beliefs or choices of
the other part through discussion, as in the lawyer-judge relation.
This relation implies persuasion: since medieval times, debates in lawsuits have
been an exercise in persuasion, with the use of rhetoric. The judge in a debate must
decide which side’s position is more plausible in light of the arguments given, and
the lawyers can use persuasive reasoning, weaving a discussion that can entail the
deliberate use of fallacies. 20
Persuasion in this case is based on a sophistic use of rationality through the art
of rhetoric, at times with an attempt to induce the opponent into biased reasoning;
but in the above case, persuasion is conducted under fair conditions because both
parts are aware of possible hidden sophisms.
– in a context in which one part aims implicitly to modify the beliefs or the choice of
the other part, through a sort of communication largely centered on emotional
messages (which is the typical style of modern advertising)21;
– in a context in which one part aims implicitly to modify the beliefs or the choice of
the other part by modifying his decisional context through so called nudging.22
All the above modes of persuasion imply a permanent dualism between autonomous
and induced individual will. It is clear that persuasion is compatible with autonomous
will only on condition that both parts in the relation are aware of the possible
19 See also Greenwald (1968)
20 Going under the name of “fallacies”, deviations from logically correct reasoning have been widely analyzed
since the XII Century; with the translation into Latin of De Sophisticis Elenchis (the last part of Aristotle’s
Organon) many scholars have attempted to detect, describe, classify and analyze fallacious arguments.
According to Hamblin:
“A fallacious argument, as almost every account from Aristotle onwards tells you, is one that seems to be
valid but is not so…. Greek has no precise synonym for ‘fallacy’, and the word so translated is generally
sophisma; ….. That Aristotle is writing about deliberate sophistry, and not about mere errors or mistakes, is
made clear quite early” Hamblin (1970), 12
21 On the connection between political leaders, discursive strategies and advertising techniques, see
Landowski (1989) who focuses on the different meaning effects through which political leaders build and
renegotiate their identity and public profile using different kind of texts.
22 In their book, Nudge, Thaler and Sunstein (2008) suggest several ways in which government agencies and
private organizations might “nudge” individuals toward actions that are better for them “as judged by
themselves”. They call this policy “libertarian paternalism”, claiming that it does not threaten liberty, because
it does not hinder individuals from choosing what they prefer. Whatever specification and mitigation could be
added to this approach, it is difficult to avoid the doubt that nudge factors are interferences with rational
choice, rather than rational determinants of choice, because of the hidden nature of the way they function.
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unintended and uncontrolled effects of persuasion, as in the first two instances; in these
cases, individual will develops autonomously, while in the other cases, it is won over
by a form of persuasion that weakens rationality. Thus, as the dual model suggests, a
way to foster the level of people’s cognitive skills is to create conditions in which the
interaction between intuitive and logical processes of thinking is strongly activated.
This may be done by an individual in isolation - with a slow and strenuous process, as
we have noted before - but it will be much more fruitful if stimulated and reinforced
through critical discussion with other persons.
Unfortunately, this is a very difficult and slow process, and Schumpeter considers it
highly unlikely to happen.
“[…..] Without the initiative that comes from immediate responsibility, ignorance
will persist in the face of masses of information however complete and correct. It
persists even in the face of the meritorious efforts that are being made to go
beyond presenting information and to teach the use of it by means of lectures,
classes, discussion groups. Results are not zero. But they are small. People cannot
be carried up the ladder”. Schumpeter (2003), 262
The recent research on debiasing has fully confirmed that public information
campaigns designed to dispel erroneous beliefs and to replace them with more accurate
information, largely fail to achieve their goal. 23
“One piece of this puzzle is that increased effort will only improve performance
when people already possess strategies that are appropriate for the task at hand; in
the absence of such strategies, they will just do the wrong thing withmore gusto”.
Schwarz et al. (2004), 128.
Here the central role of leadership emerges: proposing new strategies, and using
persuasive methods to achieve consensus. The problem is to what extent persuasion can
rest on rationality. Given the existing average gap of competence, according to
Schumpeter, most voters cannot be persuaded through purely rational arguments, and
thus advertising is a necessary instrument for mass communication.
“The psycho-technics of party management and party advertising, slogans and
marching tunes, are not accessories. They are of the essence of politics. So is the
political boss.” Schumpeter (2003), 283
There is an inherent ambiguity within the system of communication between leaders
and citizens. The political communication systems, based on the psycho-technics of
persuasive communication, facilitate a misuse, which permits the conveyance of biased
information
“Since the first thing man will do for his ideal or interest is to lie, we shall expect,
and as a matter of fact we find, that effective information is almost always
adulterated or selective and that effective reasoning in politics consists mainly
23 For a review, see Rice & Atkin (2013).
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in trying to exalt certain propositions into axioms and to put others out of court”.
Schumpeter (2003), 264
Thus communication and persuasion, which are essential for democracy, also have
an ambiguous and potentially disruptive role, which can be contrasted only if the slow
process through which citizens increase participation is rooted in the growth of
conscious rationality.
6 Revisiting Schumpeter’s vision of democracy
The Schumpeterian picture of democracy rests on the imperfect competence of citizens
and the imperfect institutional mechanisms that put them in relation with the leaders,
i.e., the ambiguous role of communication and advertising. He does not bestow upon
democracy a salvific property: unlike the classical approach, he warns that the core
problem of democracy is how to achieve rational collective decisions despite the
competence gap of the citizens.
Acknowledging that a part of thought processes are not under our deliberate control,
Schumpeter warns that achieving clear and free will is not an easy task: it requires
citizens in politics, as well as consumers and traders in economics and in finance, an
active and permanent effort that can be either fostered or hindered by the institutions.
Persuasion, as we have seen, can in fact have a very important and “positive” role in
allowing citizens to clarify their opinions and preferences. It can allow leaders to
balance divergent positions amongst citizens and achieve a common will. However,
it can also have negative effects, as it may turn into an intrusion and disguised alteration
of citizens’ preferences and wills.
The strong emphasis that Schumpeter places on the latter, perverse, effect is
unmistakable; a kind of pessimism only apparently similar to Nietzschean positions.
24 Unlike Nietzsche, Schumpeter recognizes the permanent dynamics between auton-
omous and induced will, and depicts democracy as an institution that allows people to
achieve political decisions without necessarily having a high degree of awareness and
competence. This is, in my view, the strength of the Schumpeterian theory of democ-
racy: in fact, he makes it clear that a defining property of democracy is that it is an
institution that may be working even if the degree of awareness, competence and
analytical effort of its citizens is low. Thus the main problem that Schumpeter has to
solve in sketching the fundamentals of democracy is conceiving institutions that allow
rational, or at least reasonable, public decisions despite the substantial limits of
individuals’ rationality.
The above conclusions on the conditions under which persuasion does not lead to a
manufactured will suggest that fostering critical debate among citizens and political
groups through appropriate internal institutions and regulations is vital for democracy;
democracy must enable citizens to make their political assessments and choices in a
more rational manner. If political institutions allow leaders to emerge through pacific
competition, through debates and discussions, voters can achieve a reasonably clear
24 “The strongest knowledge— that of the total unfreedom of the human will— is nonetheless the poorest in
successes, for it always has the strongest opponent: human vanity. “Nietzsche (2006) 275
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opinion about the issues in discussion. This is the function of democracy for
Schumpeter: ensuring a process of political competition that works properly, so that
leaders enjoying broad consensus can assume power.
“The democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political
decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a
competitive struggle for the people’s vote.” Schumpeter (2003), 269
Naturally, an opposite process of adverse selection in politics is permanently at
work.25 There is a possibility that the world of politics deceives citizens, that voters are
systematically sold ‘lemons’ by leaders who make vague promises, who make massive
use of covert persuasion techniques, who substitute advertising for political debate: this
generates a process of adverse selection in politics, which may induce citizens to
withdraw from the electoral market. In this case, participation declines to the point
when democracy as an institution may collapse, which happens if adverse selection
covers all different parties in the game (i.e., if competition becomes collusion for
political rent). Schumpeter clearly warns about this risk for democracy in conditions
of low rational critical debate.26
“And there is truth in Jefferson’s dictum that in the end the people are wiser than
any single individual can be, or in Lincoln’s about the impossibility of “fooling
all the people all the time.” But both dicta stress the long-run aspect in a highly
significant way. It is no doubt possible to argue that given time the collective
psyche will evolve opinions that not infrequently strike us as highly reasonable
and even shrewd. History however consists of a succession of short-run situations
that may alter the course of events for good. If all the people can in the short run
be “fooled” step by step into something they do not really want, and if this is not
an exceptional case which we could afford to neglect, then no amount of
retrospective common sense will alter the fact that in reality they neither raise
nor decide issues but that the issues that shape their fate are normally raised and
decided for them. More than anyone else the lover of democracy has every reason
to accept this fact and to clear his creed from the aspersion that it rests upon
make-believe.” Schumpeter (2003), 264 27
The problem is, therefore, to what extent a manipulated choice is intolerable to
democracy, and the possible remedies. Schumpeter claims that economic competition
shows characteristics similar to those typifying political competition in modern societies:
on the one hand, democracy is depicted as a system ensuring that the struggle for power
25 “Political representation is an outstanding example of the principal-agent relation. This means that the link
between individual utility functions and social action is tenuous, though by no means completely absent.
Representatives are no more a random sample of their constituents than physicians are of their patients”.
Arrow (1969) 13
26 More on this point in Egidi (1996)
27 This view depicts a very interesting process: advertising, communicating and persuading may distort the
conditions of choice in a way that gives rise to “hysteresis”, where hysteresis is a typical “history dependent”
characteristic of the magnetization of ferromagnetic materials. So far this type of process has relevance in
economics only in some of the papers of Blanchard and Summers (1986)
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takes the peaceful form of political election, and as a method for the selection of leaders. 28
On the other, the market is conceived as the system through which the struggle for profit is
led “in a pacific way”, based on competitive processes that elicit innovators/leaders.
On these premises, Schumpeter’s view allows us to consider both systems - market
and democracy - in a comprehensive way: he implicitly claims that exactly the same
social mechanisms and human micro-properties work in either system, the main
differences lying in the degree of conscious rationality that individuals exhibit and
the extension and intensity of competition in the two different domains.
In conclusion, with its conceptual unification of economic and political behavior,
Schumpeter’s analysis warns that virtuous selection and adverse selection are ever-
present in the market and in politics. Democracy is therefore a vulnerable institution. A
key element we have identified for understanding the threshold between the stability
and decline of democratic institutions is the competence gap between citizens and
political leaders: only if the competence gap is balanced by political leaders striving for
transparency and clarity can democracy safely run. But the behavior of political leaders
is not virtuous by nature or by law, and only a continuous working of competitive
pressures upon and among the leaders can foster the rational elements in political
debate and the growth in the long run of the self-determination of the will of citizens. 29
This picture of democracy testifies to the extreme modernity of Schumpeterian
approach, which sheds light on the essential and ambiguous role of communication
and persuasion, an element that nowadays influences the quality of democracy in a
more and more sophisticated way.
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Appendix : Wason selection task
Briefly, the selection task works as follows:
Subjects are shown four cards, each with a letter on one side and a number on the
other. The exposed card faces are A, B, 2 and 3. Subjects are asked which cards should
be turned over to test the following conditional rule:
If there is an A on one side there is a 2 on the other.
Few subjects give the right answers: A and 3. In fact, if a player turns A and on the
opposite side there is 3, then the rule is falsified; analogously the rule is falsified if he
28 See Schumpeter (2003), Section I of Chapter XII. Unlike Adam Smith’s idea of attributing to empathy the
foundations of social order, he implicitly suggest that competition socially fosters human fairness and provides
the foundations for democracy. For a wide discussion on this point, see McCann (1999).
29 Therefore, I consider misleading the attribution of an “elitist” character to the Schumpeterian view of
democracy. This attribution comes from a static interpretation of his dynamic/evolutionary description of the
working of the internal mechanisms of democracy. These mechanisms, insofar are based on a complex system
of communication and interaction between citizens and representatives, reveal the ambiguous character and
the fragility of democratic processes of decision. See Medding (1969) for a broad discussion on the elitist
views.
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turns the 3 and on the opposite side there is an A. Thus the right thing to do is to turn
the cards that could show a violation of the rule. But the majority of people pay
attention to the cards that must be turned in order verify the rule, which are A and 2.
However, most subjects give the right answer when the logically equivalent problem
is put in a form that induces individuals to check the cards that falsify the rule: this is
made by creating a context in which the Wason task is interpreted as a search for
violations of a rule. Cox and Griggs (1982) carried out an experiment with a police
officer observing people drinking in a bar who must detect which customers are
violating the rule that teenagers cannot drink alcoholic beverages. Therefore the
“cheating detection rule”, is elicited by the form in which the problem is presented
and leads them (inadvertently) to select the right cards for the solution of the problem.
Griggs and Cox reported around 75 % successful answers.
Such a result has been further generalized by Gigerenzer and Hug. The “perspective
effect” that they introduce presents the Wason Selection Task in the form of an
employer-employee contractual relation, and explores the effects of changing the role
of the subjects involved in the contract. Gigerenzer’s thesis is that a “cheating detection
mechanism” guides reasoning in the following type of selection task: if the conditional
statement is coded as a social contract, and the subject is cued into the perspective of
one party in the contract, and attention is directed to information that can reveal that one
is being cheated. This thesis has been proven by comparing two different versions of
the selection task, changing the subject that can be cheated in the contractual relation.
(Gigerenzer and Hug 1992). This shows that the context in which the problem is
framed may be an implicit guidance or impediment to solving a problem, without the
subject’s awareness.
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